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Abstract. Conceptual Modeling is a discipline of great relevance to several areas in Computer 
Science. In a series of papers [1,2,3] we have been using the General Ontological Language (GOL) 
and its underlying upper level ontology, proposed in [4,5], to evaluate the ontological correctness 
of conceptual models and to develop guidelines for how the constructs of a modeling language 
(UML) should be used in conceptual modeling. In this paper, we focus on the modeling 
metaconcepts of classifiers and objects from an ontological point of view. We use a 
philosophically and psychologically well-founded theory of universals to propose a UML profile 
for Ontology Representation and Conceptual Modeling. The formal semantics of the proposed 
modeling elements is presented in a language of modal logics with quantification restricted to 
Sortal universals.   
1   Introduction 
Conceptual Modeling is regarded as a discipline whose importance spreads throughout several 
areas in the realm of Computer Science (e.g. Software Engineering, Information Systems Design, 
Domain Engineering, Database Design, Requirements Engineering, and Knowledge Engineering, 
among others). Its main objective is concerned with identifying, analyzing and describing the essential 
concepts and constraints of a universe of discourse with the help of a (diagrammatic) modeling 
language that is based on a small set of basic meta-concepts (forming a metamodel). Ontological 
modeling, on the other hand, is concerned with capturing the relevant entities of a domain in an 
ontology of that domain using an ontology specification language that is based on a small set of basic, 
domain-independent ontological categories (forming an upper level ontology). While conceptual 
modeling languages are evaluated on the basis of their successful use in the practice domain 
information modeling, ontology specification languages and their underlying upper level ontologies 
have to be rooted in principled philosophical theories about what kinds of things exist and what their 
basic relationships with each other are.  
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a language initially proposed as a unification of several 
different visual notations and modeling techniques used for systems design [6]. UML is now a de facto 
standard for modeling computational systems and, recently, it has been proposed that the language 
should be also used as an Ontology Representation Language [7]. Moreover, in this paper the authors 
argue that although UML lacks a precise definition of its formal semantics, this difficulty shall be 
overcome with the current developments made by the precise UML community1.  
We believe, however, that defining constructs of a conceptual modeling only in terms of its 
mathematical semantics, although essential, it is not sufficient to make it a suitable ontology 
representation language. The position defended here is that, in order to model reality, a conceptual 
modeling language should be founded on formal upper-level ontologies. In other words, it should have 
both, formal and ontological semantics.  
In a series of papers we have been employing the General Ontological Language (GOL) and its 
underlying upper level ontology, proposed in [4,5], to evaluate the ontological correctness of UML 
conceptual models and to develop guidelines that assign well-defined ontological semantics to UML 
                                                
1 http://www.cs.york.ac.uk/puml/ 
modeling constructs. In [1], we have discussed the meaning of the UML metaconcepts of classes and 
objects, powertypes, association and part-whole relations (aggregation/composition). The UML 
metaconcepts of abstract classes and datatypes are addressed in a companion paper [2]. The work 
presented here can be seen as a continuation of this work in which we focus on one aspect of the 
philosophical problem between universals and particulars (roughly, classifiers and object instances in 
UML terms).  
Although classifier modeling constructs are fundamental in conceptual modeling (being present in 
all major conceptual modeling languages) there is still a deficiency of methodological support for 
helping the user of the language deciding how to model the elements of a given domain. In practice, a 
set of primitives is often used to model distinctions in different types of classifiers (Type, Role, State, 
Mixin, among others). However, the choice of how the elements that denote universal properties in a 
domain (viz. Person, Student, Red Thing, Physical Thing, Deceased Person, Customer) should be 
modeled is often made in ad hoc manner. Likewise, it is the judgment of what are the admissible 
relations between these modeling elements. Finally, an inspection of the literature shows that there is 
still much debate on the meaning of these categories [8,9].  
This paper proposes a philosophically and psychologically well-founded theory of universals 
(section 2). This theory is further used to generate a typology of UML classifiers together with a set of 
methodological guidelines that governs its use (section 3). Additionally, we provide a formal 
characterization of the types of universals proposed in section 2 in a language of modal logics with 
restricted quantification (section 4). Finally, we discuss some related work in the literature (section 5). 
Section 6 elaborates on some conclusions and future work. 
2   Towards a theory of classifier types for Conceptual Modeling: philosophical 
and psychological foundations 
In [10], van Leeuwen shows an important syntactical difference in natural languages that reflects a 
semantical and ontological one, namely, the difference between common nouns (CNs) on one side and 
arbitrary general terms (adjectives, verbs, mass nouns, etc…) on the other. CNs have the singular 
feature that they can combine with determiners and serve as argument for predication in sentences such 
as:  
 
(i) (exactly) five mice were in the kitchen last night;  
(ii)  the mouse which has eaten the cheese, has been in eaten in turn by the cat.  
 
In other words, if we have the patterns (exactly) five X… and the Y which is Z…, only the 
substitution of X,Y,Z by CNs will produce sentences which are grammatical. To see that, we can try 
the substitution by the adjective Red in the sentence (i): (exactly) five red were in the kitchen last night. 
A request to ‘count the red in this room’ cannot receive a definite answer: Should a red shirt be counted 
as one or should the shirt, the two sleeves, and two pockets be counted separately so that we have five 
reds? The problem in this case is not that one would not know how to finish the counting but that one 
would not know how to start since arbitrarily many subparts of a red thing are still red.  
The explanation for this feature unique of CNs lies on the function that determinates 
(demonstratives and quantifiers) play in noun phrases, which is to determine a certain range on 
individuals. Both reference and quantification requires that the thing (or things) which are referred or 
which form the domain of quantification are determinate individuals, i.e., their conditions for 
individuation and identity must be determinate. In other words, if it is not determinate how to count Xs 
or how to identify X that is the same as Y, the sentences in the patterns (i) and (ii) do not express 
determinate propositions, i.e. propositions with definite truth values. 
The distinction between the grammatical categories of CNs and arbitrary general terms can be 
explained in terms of the ontological categories of Sortal and Characterizing universals [11], which are 
roughly their ontological counterparts. Whilst the latter supply only a principle of application for the 
individuals they collect, the former supply both a principle of application and a principle of identity.  A 
principle of application is that in accordance with which we judge whether a general term applies to a 
particular (e.g. whether something is a Person, a Dog, a Chair or a Student). A principle of identity 
supports the judgment whether two particulars are the same, i.e., in which circumstances the identity 
relation holds.    
In [12], Macnamara, investigates the role of sortal concepts in cognition and provides a 
comprehensive theory for explaining the process that a child undergoes when learning proper nouns 
and common nouns. He proposes the following example: suppose a little boy (Tom), which is about to 
learn the meaning of a proper name for his puppy. When presented to the word Spot”, Tom has to 
decide what it refers to. One should notice that a demonstrative such as “that” will not be sufficient to 
determinate the bearer of the proper name? How to decide that “that” which changes all its perceptual 
properties is still Spot? In other words, which changes can Spot suffer and still be the same? As 
Macnamara (among others) shows, answers to these questions are only possible if Spot is taken to be a 
proper name for an individual, which is an instance of a Sortal universal. The principles of identity 
supplied by the Sortals are essential to judge the validity of all identity statements. For example, if for 
an instance of the sortal Statue loosing a piece will not alter the identity of the object, the same does not 
hold for an instance of Lump of Clay. 
The statement that we can only make identity and quantification statements in relation to a Sortal 
amounts to one of the best-supported theories in the philosophy of language, namely, that the identity 
of an individual can only be traced in connection with a Sortal Universal, which provides a principle of 
individuation and identity to the particulars it collects [10,12,13,14].  The position advocated in this 
article affirms an equivalent stance for a theory of conceptual modeling. We defend that among the 
conceptual modeling counterparts of general terms (classifiers), only constructs that represent 
substance sortals can provide a principle of identity and individuation for its instances. As a 
consequence, the following principle can be postulated: 
 
Postulate 1:  Every Object in a conceptual model (CM) of the domain must be an instance of a CM-
class representing a sortal.  
 
As argued by Kripke [15], a proper name is a rigid designator, i.e. it refers to the same individual 
in all possible situations, factual or counterfactual. For instance, it refers to the individual Mick Jagger 
both now (when he is the lead singer of Rolling Stones and 60 years old) and in the past (when he was 
the boy Mike Philip living in Kent, England). Moreover, it refers to the same individual in 
counterfactual situations such as the one in which he decided to continue in the London School of 
Economics and has never pursued a musical career. We would like to say that the boy Mike Philip is 
identical with the man Mick Jagger that he latter became. However, as pointed out by Wiggins [16] and 
Perry [17], statements of identity only make sense if both referents are of the same type. Thus, we 
could not say that a certain Boy is the same Boy as a certain Man since the latter is not a Boy (and vice-
versa). However, as Putnam put it, when a man x points to a boy in a picture and says “I am that boy”, 
the pronoun “I” in question is typed not by Man but by a supertype of Man and Boy (namely, Person) 
which embraces x’s entire existence [18]. A generalization of this idea amount to a thesis, proposed by 
Wiggins, named thesis D [16]:  If an individual falls under two sortals in the course of its history there 
must be exactly one ultimate sortal of which both sortals are specializations. Griffin elaborates 
Wiggins’ thesis D in terms of two correlated principles:  
 
a) The Restriction Principle: if an individual falls under two distinct sortals F, F’ in the course 
of its history then there is at least one sortal which F and F’ are both specializations.  
b) The Uniqueness Principle: if an individual falls under two distinct sortals F, F’ in the course 
of its history then there is only one ultimate sortal which F and F’ are both specializations. A 
sortal F is ultimate if there is no other sortal F’ distinct from F which F specializes. 
   
It is not the case that two incompatible principles of identity could apply to the same individual x, 
otherwise x would not be a viable entity (determinate particular) [10]. Imagine an individual x which is 
an instance of both Statue and Lump of clay. Now, the answer to the question whether loosing a piece 
will alter the identity of x is indeterminate since each of the two principles of identity that x obeys 
imply a different answer. As a consequence, we can say that if two sortals F and F’ intersect (i.e. have 
common individuals in their extension), the principles of identity contained in them must be equivalent. 
Moreover, F and F’ cannot supply a principle of identity for x, since both sortals apply to x only 
contingently and a principle of identity must be used to identify x all possible worlds. Therefore, there 
must be a sortal G that supplies the principle of identity carried by F and F’. This proves the restriction 
principle. The uniqueness of the ultimate sortal G can be argued as follows: (i) G is a sortal, since it 
supplies a principle of identity for all the things in its extension; (ii) if it restricts a sortal H then, since 
H cannot supply a incompatible principle of identity, H either: is equivalent to G (i.e. supply the same 
principle of identity) and therefore should be ultimate or does not supply a principle of identity for the 
particulars in its extension (see text on dispersive classifiers below). This proves the uniqueness 
principle. The unique ultimate sortal G that supplies the principle of identity for its instances is named 
a substance sortal.  
As a consequence of the uniqueness principle we define a second postulate: 
 
Postulate 2:  A Object in a conceptual model of the domain cannot instantiate more than one CM-
Class representing an ultimate Substance Sortal.  
 
In the example above, the sortal Person is the unique substance sortal that defines the validity of 
the claim that Mick Jagger is the same as Mike Philip or, in other words, that Mike Philip persists 
through changes in height, weight, age, residence, etc… as the same individual. Person can only be the 
sortal that supports the proper name Mick Jagger in all possible situations because it applies necessarily 
to the individual referred by the proper name, i.e. instances of Person cannot cease to be so without 
ceasing to exist. As a consequence, the extension of a substance sortal is world invariant. This meta-
property of classifiers is named Modal Constancy [14] or rigidity [19].  
Sortals such as Boy and Adult Man in the example above, but also Student, Employee, Caterpillar 
and Butterfly, Philosopher, Writer, Alive and Deceased, which possibly apply to a continuant during a 
certain phase of its existence, are named phased-sortal in [16]. As a consequence of the Restriction 
Principle we have that for every phased-sortal PS that applies to a continuant, there is a substance 
sortal S of which PS is a specialization. 
Contrary to substance sortals, phased-sortals apply to individuals contingently and, thus, do not 
enjoy modal constancy. For example, for an individual John instance of Student, we can easily imagine 
John moving in an out of the Student type, while being the same individual, i.e. without loosing his 
identity. Moreover, for every instance x of Student in a world w, there is another world w’ in which x is 
not an instance of Student.  This meta-property of classifiers is name anti-rigid in [19].  
By considering how these different universals stand w.r.t rigidity another postulate can be derived:  
 
Postulate 3:  A CM-Class representing a rigid classifier cannot be a subclass a CM-Class representing 
an anti-rigid classifier  
 
If PS is a phased-sortal and S is the substance sortal specialized by PS, there is a specialization 
condition φ such that x is a PS iff x is a S that satisfies φ [10]. A further clarification on the different 
types of specialization conditions allows us to distinguish between two different types of phased-sortals 
which are of great importance to the practice of conceptual modeling, namely, phases and roles.  
Phases constitute possible stages in the history of a substance sortal. Examples are: (a) Alive and 
Deceased: as possible stages of a Person; (b) Catterpillar and Butterfly of a Lepidopteran; (c) Town and 
Metropolis of a City; (d) Boy, Male Teenager and Adult Male of a Male Person. Classifiers 
representing phases constitute a partition of the substance sortal they specialize. For example, if 
<Alive, Deceased> is a phase-partition of a sustance sortal Person then for every world w, every 
Person x is either and instance of Alive or of Deceased but not of both. Moreover, if x is an instance of 
Alive in world w then there is world w’ such that x is not an instance of Alive in w’, which in this case, 
implies that x is an instance of Deceased in w’.  
Contrary to phases, roles do not necessarily form a partition of substance sortals. Moreover, they 
differ from phases in terms of the specialization condition φ. For a phase P, φ represents a condition 
that depends solely on intrinsic properties of P. For instance, one might say that if Mick Jagger is a 
Living Person then he is a Person who has the property of being alive or, if Spot is a Puppy then it is a 
Dog who has the property of being less than a year old. For a role R, conversely, φ depends on extrinsic 
(relational) properties of R. For example, one might say that John is a Student then John is a Person 
who is enrolled in some educational institution or that, if Peter is a Customer then Peter is a Person 
who buys a Product y from a Supplier z. In other words, an entity plays a role in a certain context, 
demarcated by its relation with other entities.  
Although Frege argued at length that “one cannot count without knowing what to count”, in 
artificial logical languages inspired by him, natural language general terms such as CNs, adjectives and 
verbs are treated uniformly as predicates. For instance, if we want to represent the sentence “there are 
tall men”, in the fregean approach of classical logic we would write ∃x Man(x) ∧ Tall(x). This reading 
puts the count noun Man (which denotes a Sortal) on an equal logical footing with the predicate Tall. 
Moreover, in this formula, the variable x is interpreted into a “supposedly” universal kind Thing. So, 
the natural language reading of the formula should be “there are things which have the property of 
being a man and the property of being tall”. Since, by postulate 1, all individuals must be instances of a 
substance sortal we must conclude that Thing is a unique universal ultimate sortal which is able to 
supply a principle of identity for all elements that we consider in our universe of discourse. Moreover, 
by postulate 2, this principle of identity must be unique. Can that be the case? 
In [20], Hirsch argues that concepts such as Thing, (Entity, Element, among others) are dispersive, 
i.e. they cover many concepts with different principles of identity. For instance, in the extension of 
Thing we might encounter an individuals x which is a cow and an individual y which is a watch. Since 
the principles of identity for Cows and Watches are not the same we conclude that Thing cannot supply 
a principle of identity for its instances. Otherwise, x and y would obey incompatible principles of 
identity and, thus, would not be determinate individuals. Therefore, as defended in [10,13,14,20], 
dispersive concepts do not denote sortals (despite the fact that they are considered CNs in natural 
languages) and therefore cannot have direct instances. More than that, since a principle of identity 
supplied by a substance sortal G is inherited by all classifiers that specialize G or, to put in another 
way, all subtypes of G carry the principle of identity supplied by G. Thus, all subclasses of a sortal are 
themselves sortals, ergo, 
 
Postulate 4:  A CM-Class representing a dispersive universal cannot be a subclass of a CM-Class 
representing a Sortal  
3   An Ontologically well-founded UML profile for conceptual modeling  
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) has built in extension mechanisms that allow one to 
modify the language elements to suite certain modeling needs. A coherent set of such extensions, 
defined accordingly to a specific purpose or domain, constitutes a UML profile [6].  
A Stereotype is a lightweight extension mechanism that allows one to specialize UML modeling 
elements by defining additional constraints and sometimes a different graphical notation, so that they 
behave in some aspects as if they were instances of elements defined in new virtual metamodel. 
Stereotypes are also used to indicate difference in meaning or usage between modeling elements with a 
similar structure.  
In [3], we have proposed a profile for UML to support the design of ontologically well-founded 
conceptual models according to the theory proposed in section 2. This profile (summarized in table 1) 
comprises of a set of stereotyped classes (specializations of the meta-construct class) that represents 
finer-grained distinctions between different types of substantial universals. Additionally, the profile 
incorporates a number of constraints that is applied to relations involving these stereotyped classes. In 
the same article, we have demonstrated the relevance of this proposal by applying it to solve recurrent 
problems in the practice of conceptual modeling. In particular, we were able to derive a design pattern 
to address a recurrent problem in role modeling presented by Steimann in [9].   
 
Stereotype Description Constraints 
«kind»
A
 
A kind represents a substance sortal, i.e. 
rigid, externally independent universals that 
supply a principle of identity for its 
instances. Examples could be instances of 
Natural Kinds (such as Person, Dog, Tree) 
and artifacts (Chair, Car, Television).  
Every object in conceptual model using 
this profile must be an instance of a 
Kind, directly or indirectly (postulate 1). 
Moreover, it cannot be an instance of 
more than one ultimate Kind (postulate 
2). A supertype of a kind cannot be a 
member of {« subkind », « phase », « 
role », « roleMixin »} 
«subkind»
A
A
 
A subkind is a rigid, externally independent 
restriction of a kind which carries the 
principle of identity supplied by the kind. An 
example could be the subkind MalePerson of 
the kind Person. In general, the stereotype 
«subkind» can be omitted in conceptual 
models without loss of clarity. 
A sypertype of a subkind cannot be a 
member of {« phase », « role », « 
roleMixin »}       
«phase»
A
 
It represents the phased-sortals phase, i.e. 
anti-rigid and externally independent 
universals defined as part of a partition of a 
kind. For instance, the partition {Catterpillar, 
Butterfly} of the kind Lepdopterum.   
The phases {P1…Pn} that form a 
partition of a Kind K are defined in UML 
as a disjoint and complete generalization 
set. The kind K is always depicted as an 
abstract class.  
 
«role»
A
 
It represents a phased-sortal role, i.e. anti-
rigid and externally dependent universal. For 
instance, the role student played by instance 
of the kind Person. 
Roles and Phases are anti-rigid 
universals and cannot appear in a 
conceptual model as a superclass of a 
Kind (postulate 3). Moreover: Let X be a 
class stereotyped as « role » and r be an 
association representing X’s restriction 
condition. Then, #X.r ≥ 1 
 
«category»
A
 
It represents a rigid and externally 
independent non-sortal, a dispersive 
universal that aggregates essential properties 
which are common to different kinds. For 
example, the category RationalEntity as a 
generalization of Person and 
IntelligentAgent.  
A category cannot have direct instances 
and must be depicted as an abstract class. 
A supertype of a category cannot be a 
member of {« kind », « subkind », « 
phase », « role », « roleMixin »} 
«roleMixin»
A
 
It represents an anti-rigid and externally 
dependent non-sortal, a dispersive universal 
that aggregates properties which are 
common to different roles. In includes 
formal roles such as whole and part and 
initiatior and responder.  
A role mixin cannot have direct instances 
and must be depicted as an abstract class. 
A supertype of a role mixin cannot be a 
member of {« kind », « subkind », « 
phase », « role »}. Let X be a class 
stereotyped as « roleMixin » and r be an 
association representing X’s restriction 
condition. Then, #X.r ≥ 1     
«mixin»
A
 
The stereotype «mixin» represents properties 
which are essential to some of its instances 
and accidental to others (a meta-property 
named semi-rigidity in [19]).  An example is 
the mixin Seatable, which represents a 
property that can be considered essential to 
the kinds Chair and Stool but accidental to 
Crate, Paper Box or Rock. 
A mixin cannot have direct instances and 
must be depicted as an abstract class. 
A supertype of a mixin cannot be a 
member of {« kind », « subkind », « 
phase », « role », « roleMixin »} 
 
It is important to emphasize that the particular classes chosen to exemplify each of the proposed 
categories are used for illustration purposes only. For example, when stereotyping class Person as a 
Kind we are not advocating that Person should be in general considered as a kind in conceptual 
modeling. Conversely, the intention is to make explicit the consequences of this modeling choice. The 
choice itself, nonetheless, is always left to the model designer.             
4   A formal characterization of the proposed categories  
In this section we provide a formal characterization of the notions discussed in section 2 by using a 
language L of quantified modal logics with identity. A model M in this language is a structure 
<W,D,δ> where W is a non-empty set of worlds, D is a non-empty domain of objects and δ is an 
interpretation function assigning values to the non-logical constants of the language. The domain D of 
quantification is that of possibilia, which includes all possible entities independent of their actual 
existence. Therefore we shall quantify over a constant domain in all possible worlds. Moreover, all 
worlds are equally accessible and therefore we omit the accessibility relation from the model structure. 
As a result we have a language that differs from the simplest language of quantified modal logic (QS5) 
[21] in two points. First, all quantification is restricted by special predicates called sorts. We adopt the 
following notation proposed in [14]   
 
(i) (∀S,x) A   
(ii) (∃S,x) A     
 
which can be read as for every instance of S A holds and there is an instance of S such that A holds, 
respectively. 
In this article, (i) and (ii) are meta-linguistic abbreviations to the formulas (∀x S(x) → A) and (∃x 
S(x) ∧ A), respectively, i.e., they conform to the Fregean analysis of restricted quantification. However, 
the primitive objects of quantification (elements of D) are continuants and as proposed in [10], the 
predicates used to restrict quantification represent the sortal universals that carry the principles identity, 
which are constitutive of the individuals that fall in their extension. 
Second, individual constants of the language represent proper names of individuals (continuants) 
and, therefore, the interpretation function δ defined as 
 
(iii) δ(c,w) ∈ D, in which c is an individual constant 
(iv) δ(S,w) ⊆ D, in which S is a sort 
(v) δ(Pn,w) ⊆ Dn, in which P is a n-ary predicate  
 
must obey the following constraint: for all w,w’ ∈ W, δ(c,w) = δ(c,w’), i.e. the interpretation of an 
individual constant c (proper name) is world invariant. This amount to Kripke’s thesis that proper 
names are rigid designators [15] and conforms to Montague’s meaning postulate 1 (MP1) [10].   
The quantification restricted in this way makes explicit what is only implicit in standard predicate 
logics. As previously discussed, suppose we want to state the following proposition : (a) There are red 
tasty apples. In classical predicate logic we would write down a logical formula such as (b) ∃x 
(apple(x) ∧ tasty(x) ∧ red(x)). In an ontological reading, (b) states that “there are things which are red, 
tasty and apple”. The theory proposed section 2 rejects that we can conceptually grasp an individual 
under a general concept such as Thing or Entity or, what is almost the same, that a logic (or conceptual 
modeling language) should presupposed the notion of a bare particular. Moreover, it states that only a 
sortal (e.g. Apple) can carry a principle of identity for the individuals it collects, a property which is 
absent in attributions such as Red and Tasty.  For this reason, a logical system when as used to 
represent a formalization of conceptual models, should not presupposed that the representations of 
natural general terms such as Apple, Tasty and Red stand in the same logical footing. For this reason, 
(a) should be represented as (∃Apple,x) (tasty(x) ∧ red(x)) in which the sortal binding the variable x its 
the one responsible for carrying its principle of identity.  
 
Let F and G be two arbitrary universals such that F is specializes G. As a consequence we have that 
1.  □ (∀F,x G(x)) 
if G is a rigid universal then  
2. □(∀G,x □G(x)) 
or in other words, for all w,w’ ∈ W we have that δ(G,w) = δ(G,w’)    
 
For instance, Figure 1 depicts an example with the kind Person and its subkind Man. In this case we 
have the following instantiations of (1) and (2):  
□ (∀Man,x Person(x))  □(∀Man,x □Man(x)) □(∀Person,x □Person(x)) 
 
In fact, in this example, the subkinds Man and Woman form a partition of the kind Person. In general, 
if <U1…Un> is a partition of a universal U then we have that 
3. □(∀U,x U1(x) ⊕…⊕ Un(x)) 
 
and, in this specific case, □(∀Person,x Man(x) ⊕ Woman(x)).  
In the same figure 1, another partition is present, namely, the phase-partition Child, Adolescent, 
Adult of the kind Person. Phases are always defined as a partition and, thus, formula (3) always hold 
for a phase-partition <K1…Kn>of a substance sortal S. Besides that, for all Ka,Kb ∈ <K1…Kn> such 
that a ≠ b we have that 
4. □(∀Ka,x ◊Kb(x))  
 
in the example of figure 1, 
□(∀Child,x ◊Adolescent(x))  □(∀Child,x ◊Adult(x))   
□(∀Adolescent,x ◊Child(x)) □(∀Adolescent,x ◊Adult(x)) 
□(∀Adult,x ◊Child(x))  □(∀Adult,x ◊Adolescent(x)) 
 
Formula (4) implies 
5. □(∀Ki,x ◊¬Ki(x)) 
 
which is a more general statement of anti-rigidity and, hence, applies to all phased-sortals including 
roles. In figure 2, Student represents a role played by instances of the kind Person. As previously 
mentioned, roles differ from phases w.r.t. their specialization conditions. In figure 1, the association 
enrollment φenrollment ⊆ Student × School represents a extrinsic property that must necessary apply to all 
instances of Student. In general, we can state the following: Let R be a role that specializes a sortal S 
(named its allowed type) and let φ be a relation representing the restriction condition for R, such that φ 
⊆ R × T, where T represents a type on which R is externally dependent [19]. Then, 
6. □(∀R,x ∃T,y φ(x,y)) 
  
in the case of figure 1  
□(∀Student,x ◊¬Student(x)) □(∀Student,x ∃School,y φ(x,y)) 
 
Finally, we can show why the postulate 3 (section 2) must be reinforced in conceptual models. To 
see that is the case suppose there is a rigid classifier G which specializes an anti-rigid classifier F. Let 
{a,b,c,d} and {a,b} be the extension of F and G in world w, respectively. By (5), there is a world w’ in 
which a ∈ δ(F,w) is not in δ(F,w’) (a ∉ δ(F,w’)) . By (2), however, δ(G,w) = δ(G,w’) and, by (1), 
δ(G,w’) ⊆ δ(F,w’), ergo, a ∈ δ(F,w’) which is a contradiction. We have therefore shown that it is not 
the case that a rigid classifier could specialize an anti-rigid one. 
  
«kind»
Person
Man
Woman
«phase»
Child
«phase»
Adolescent
«phase»
Adult  
«role»
Student School
enrollment
1
«kind»
Person
 
 
Figure 1 (left) – Example depicting a kind and two of its partitions: a subkind-partition and a phase-
partition; Figure 2 – Example depicting a phased-sortal role, its allowed type and relational restriction 
condition.   
5  Related work  
5.1 OntoClean  
 
The work presented here has been strongly influenced by OntoClean, which proposes a number of 
methodological guidelines to evaluate the conceptual correctness of generalization relationships [19]. 
Despite bearing a strong similarity with OntoClean’s useful property types, the stereotypes presented in 
table 1 also hold some important differences. Firstly, rigid sortals in our typology are always 
considered to be independent. Examples of rigid sortals that are typically considered dependent are 
universals whose instances are features in the sense of [22] (e.g. holes, bumps, stains). In the scope of 
this work, features are considered parts of their hosts (as opposed to moments inhering in them [2]) and 
therefore do not qualify as dependent entities according to the definition of [19]. Conversely, the 
relation between a feature and its host is considered one of inseparable parthood. We say, for instance, 
that a hole in a piece of cheese is an inseparable part of the cheese not externally dependent on it. 
Likewise, continuants can have features as essential parts. For instance, the key whole of a locker may 
be considered an essential part of the locker. The distinctions between inseparable parts/mandatory 
wholes and essential/mandatory parts are explained in details in [1]. Another consequence of this 
choice is that categories, which typically represent abstractions of different Kinds, are also always 
considered to be independent.  
A second difference exists regarding the use of the word mixin. In OntoClean, mixin is used to 
denote a combination (conjunction or disjunction) of rigid and non-rigid properties which are 
subsumed by at least one sortal. Therefore, in this sense mixin is also a sortal. An example is a 
combination of the kind CAT and the role WEAPON producing the semi-rigid CAT-or-WEAPON. We 
believe that the category denoted by this sense of the word Mixins, although useful in structuring large 
ontologies, is of little use in conceptual modeling. Conversely, we use the word here according to its 
widespread use in the object modeling community, i.e. as an abstract type that can have instances of 
different classes but no direct instances [23]. In this sense, mixins include category, role mixin but also 
what is called attribution in [19]. Moreover, the stereotype « roleMixin » used here posses the same 
meta-properties as the category of formal roles in OntoClean. As previously mentioned in this article, 
role mixins include the category of formal roles but it also includes dispersive types which are 
abstractions of common properties of material roles.              
Finally, in Ontoclean, despite of having the same meta-properties, phases are not explicit required 
to be defined as a partition of its superclass.  
  
5.2 The BWW (Bunge-Wand-Weber) approach  
 
An approach that shares the same objectives as the work presented here is the approach by 
Evermann and Wand [8] and Wand, Storey and Weber [25]. In these two articles, the authors report 
their results in mapping common constructs of conceptual modeling to an upper level ontology. Their 
approach is based on the BWW ontology, a framework created by Wand and Weber on the basis of the 
original metaphysical theory developed by Mario Bunge in [24]. In [8], Evermann and Wand propose 
that a UML class should be used to represent a BWW-natural kind (it should be equivalent to 
functional schema of a BWW-natural kind). A natural kind is defined by Bunge as “a set of substantial 
things that share lawfully related properties”. According to this definition, the authors’ proposal for the 
interpretation of the UML class meta-construct is equivalent to that of kinds and subkinds (i.e. rigid 
sortals) defined in this article. A law is an essential property of its instances (by definition). Since a 
natural kind is a grouping of things that share these essential properties it is, also by definition, a rigid 
class. Equating a natural kind with the denotation of a substance sortal concept of continuants is in 
conformance with other works in the philosophical literature [10]. 
As demonstrated throughout this work, kinds constitute a subset of the of category types that are 
necessary to represent the phenomena available in cognition and language. In particular, a UML class 
modeling construct representing a kind is only one of a set of modeling constructs which should be 
available to the conceptual modeler.       
6  Conclusions and Future Work 
The development of a well-grounded, axiomatized upper level ontology is an important step 
towards the definition of real-world semantics for conceptual modeling diagrammatic languages. In this 
paper, we use a philosophically and psychologically well-founded theory of universals to address the 
problem of classifiers in conceptual modeling.  
This theory is further used in the definition of a UML profile for Ontology Representation and 
Conceptual Modeling. The profile comprises of a set of stereotypes representing distinctions on types 
of classifiers proposed by the theory (e.g., Kind, Role, Phase, Category, Mixin) as well as a set of 
constraints on the possible relations to be established between these elements (representing the 
postulates of the theory).  
A formalization of the theory is provided in a language of first-order modal logics with 
quantification restricted to Sortal universals. This formalization shall be extended in a future paper in 
which the difference between Sortals and arbitrary general terms will be emphasized. In particular, we 
intend to use separated intentional properties (in the spirit of Gupta’s logic of Common Nouns [14]) to 
represent the intention of Sortal universals and to model the principles of identity and persistence 
supplied by them. This will enable us to formally address the notion of object state from an ontological 
point of view.     
We believe that these results contribute to the task of defining ontological foundations and 
principled engineering tools for the discipline of conceptual modeling.  
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